In a recent article in this journal J. Pelzman and G. Schoepfle (hereafter PS) provide estimates of the trade effects of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA).' They use two models to estimate the increase in CBERA export earnings. The first is a traditional partial equilibrium trade creation/trade diversion model and the second is a shift-share model. In the first part of this comment we show that they use an incorrect equation in their partial equilibrium model and that they compound this error by making incorrect use of empirical import demand elasticities. As a result, the estimates they report are not valid. In the second part of the comment, we provide more reasonable estimates of the economic impact of the CBERA. R* = l [(1 + E)/(E -rq)lt*, (1) where R* is the percentage change in CBERA export earnings r from tariff preferences, rl is the U.S. elasticity of demand for from CBERA countries (defined as negative), E is the elasti supply of CBERA exports to the United States, and t* is the p age change in price resulting from the preferential tariff reduct t* = -T/[1 + TI], where T is the ad valorem tariff rate).2 R* in value between -t* (for E = 0) and rqt* (for E = o); since t* a both negative, R* must be positive (except in the extreme cas 0).3 More will be made of this point later when we discuss th estimates.
Citing difficulties in obtaining reliable estimates of E and rl, PS estimate the impact of the CBERA using their equation (p. 780): AM = Mrqt*, (2) where M is the value of U.S. import U.S. aggregate import demand elastic tries rather than just CBERA countr is a reduced-form equation derived from model. In fact, it is the traditional e creation effects of preferential tarif sion.5 Thus, their estimates of "gros net increase in U.S. imports from extent to which preferential tariffs placing imports from other countri biased downward. We now turn to th Using equation (1), PS calculate ( would be $24.7 million if the CBERA the bounds for equation (1) as discuss state (overstate) the true gross trade elasticity of U.S. demand for import Pelzman and Schoepfle go on to esti using Stern's "best guess" elasticity e dard deviation.6 The results of this e Although it is impossible for a pref imports from preferred countries to demand and supply curves (under su tries would refuse to use CBERA p goods to the United States under nor theless report negative estimates of countries.' In fact, their low-range e combined is a negative $164 millio the United States of more than 100% Instead of examining these results f added, or allowed the computer to a demand elasticity estimates even if demand curve, thereby producing n Pelzman and Schoepfle's total estimates of "gross trade creation" range from a negative $164.2 million to a positive $266.9 million. In percentage terms this works out to a range of negative 104% to a positive 169%.
A corrected estimate of total trade creation is calculated to be $51.3 million. Using the Baldwin and Murray technique, our estimat of trade diversion is $10.2 million.9 The estimated total impact of th CBERA on exports from the region is $61.6 million. These corrected estimates would represent a 33% increase in exports from the CBER countries due to trade creation and a 6% increase due to trade diver-sion. The projected overall increase of 39% would seem to reasonable estimate of the effects of the CBERA than the PS estimates.
III. Conclusions
All estimates of changes in trade flows caused by tariff reduc of necessity "rough orders of magnitude." Some estimates, h are rougher than others. The original estimates presented by P from the totally implausible (a drop in CBERA countries exp the merely unlikely (exports more than double). Since the re ported by PS are based on the misapplication of an inappropriate model, this is not surprising. The corrected estimates presented here indicate that the exports of the CBERA countries may rise by approximately $51.3 million due to trade creation and $10.2 million due to trade diversion. These results are both conceptually correct and, unlike the PS results, are at least plausible. 4. Pelzman and Schoepfle state, "Consequently the analysis assumes that import elasticities estimated for total U.S. imports also represent the response of domestic buyers to changes in the price of imports from the CBERA nations" (pp. 780-81) . This assumption is not a neutral one. The aggregate U.S. import demand is less elastic than the average of U.S. demands for imports from individual countries or country groups if imports from these different sources are substitutes for each other, which is the reasonable assumption. Thus, PS need some justification for their implicit assumption that the U.S. demand for imports from CBERA nations is less elastic than the average of U.S. demands for imports from other sources. Stated this way, their implicit assumption seems quite implausible, particularly since it is applied uniformly across all products.
5. For a recent detailed examination of the partial equilibrium model to estimate trade creation and trade diversion generated from preferential tariff 6. The source of these elasticities is confusing. The note to table 10 refers to Stern's "best guess" elasticities, which presumably come from R. M. Stern, J. Francis, and B. Schumacher, Price Elasticities in International Trade: An Annotated Bibliography (London: Macmillan, 1976) . However, these elas-
